Book Review: Taking the Constitution Seriously. by Walter Berns. by Polsby, Daniel D.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Constitutional Commentary
1989
Book Review: Taking the Constitution Seriously.
by Walter Berns.
Daniel D. Polsby
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Polsby, Daniel D., "Book Review: Taking the Constitution Seriously. by Walter Berns." (1989). Constitutional Commentary. 185.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/185
1989] BOOK REVIEWS 459 
ment. That aspiration contains many difficult tensions, to be sure, 
and it exacts a price, but fidelity to the aspirations of the tradition 
means fidelity to those tensions, and willingness to pay that price. 
For all his talk about the American political tradition and its 
aspirations, Perry is remarkably untouched by contact with any of 
its wellsprings. In my opinion, he would do better to read a little 
less of contemporary philosophy (even here less can be more) and 
devote more time instead to the materials of the tradition. He 
might begin with The Federalist and read carefully what the authors 
have to say about republicanism and about the unacceptability of 
governance by "a will independent of society." He then might try 
Abraham Lincoln, who shared Perry's concern for the moral 
groundings and aspirations of the American polity, but who yet un-
derstood far better what these required for a "government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people." And finally, he might 
reread Alexander Bickel, whom he quotes from time to time, but 
always in a self-serving way. He might consider how Bickel came 
to write a book called The Morality of Consent. 
It is easy to sympathize with Perry's desire for a moral com-
munity, but even easier to be repelled by his desire to further the 
rule of willfulness over the rule of law. But willfulness, no matter 
how dressed up in the latest philosophic theories and the most high-
minded rhetoric remains-willfulness. 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY. By Walter 
Berns.t New York: Simon & Schuster. 1987. Pp. 288. 
$19.95. 
Daniel D. Polsby 2 
Constitutions are things whose substance is language; and nat-
ural languages are alive with wormholes and pitfalls, so plastic in 
the hands of an interpreter that the true study of a political consti-
tution lies not in the intentions of those who drafted the text, but of 
those who have interpreted it. It is people, not words, that possess 
meaning. Such, at any rate, is the modern fashion, against which 
the old convention, the Constitution as a framework of constraints 
and fences and walls, stands in stark contrast. 
Professor Walter Berns seems entirely unaffected by the mod-
I. John M. Olin Professor. Georgetown University. 
2. Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
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ern fashion. For him, the Constitution is a thing of ideas. Indeed, 
he sees not one Constitution but a nest of constitutions. First of all, 
there is the constitution of those who may constitute the govern-
ment: Professor Berns places the Declaration of Independence at 
the center of constitutional theory. Then the Constitution proper, 
which constituted the government. Finally the Bill of Rights, 
which constituted the means by which the government undertook 
to be governed itself. 
Berns's distinction between "fundamental rights" and "created 
rights" (or "interests") is central to his argument about the Consti-
tution and how courts should deal with it. "Fundamental rights," 
like the right to own and dispose of property, are the sorts of things 
that political constitutions can be founded upon: "created rights," 
rooted merely in a court's ipse dixit, are not. Privacy and all its 
entailments is an example of a created right. By going forward with 
the privacy oeuvre, the courts deprive the public of the right to de-
bate this question; the power of the unelected judges to make funda-
mental law is broadened at the expense of the political process. 
But of course rights are like that, wherever they come from. 
Berns, a non-lawyer, would surely profit from a few weeks in a law 
school Torts or Property class. As Justice Holmes pointed out, 
"rights"-never mind what kind-tend to declare themselves abso-
lute to their logical extremes. However fundamental a right may 
be, it eventually bumps into another right: my right of free speech 
versus your right to quiet; my right to grow tomatillos versus your 
right to cast a shadow. 
Courts must resolve these conflicts according to law. The pat-
tern of their resolution, indeed, is the most important datum we 
possess concerning what the "law" is. The nice metaphysical ques-
tion, a variant of the problem that Socrates posed to Euthyphro, 
whether the judges make law or follow it, will probably always be 
an important issue in political theory. But to lawyers it is no longer 
of practical interest. There was, no doubt, a time when legal realists 
could induce frissons in law students by proclaiming, "it's law be-
cause we say it is." But that was fifty and more years ago. 
The process of judging within a set of never-repeating facts will 
necessarily produce at least the illusion of amoebic locomotion in 
the law. It is not obvious why constitutional law and common law 
should differ much in this particular. To do their job, judges have 
to do things that look like lawmaking. Berns seems to think it is 
otherwise. He claims, for instance, that "read literally," the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause is addressed to state courts 
and their procedures, and does not entitle judges to address them-
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selves to the substance of what the process protects. But a court 
cannot possibly understand "due process" until it understands what 
things "due process" attaches to. The Supreme Court's long ago-
nies over what process is due and when have almost always involved 
the non-obvious question of what is "property" (or "liberty") and 
what is not. These cases have seemed difficult for the simple reason 
that they are difficult. Unavoidably, they summon the court to for-
mulate and characterize the "substance"-horrors!-of an underly-
ing claim. If my job is "property," then the state may not take it 
from me without "due process." If it isn't "property," then it may. 
Moreover, it is evident that a "created right," like that of "pri-
vacy," might, at least as an original matter, be considered just as 
fundamental, and just as foundational, as the right to own property, 
pace Berns, who does not see how a constitutional order could be 
based on the various acts that "privacy" is supposed to immunize. 
A pretty persuasive case could be made, for example, that property 
and privacy are merely different phases of one larger concept: the 
old-fashioned liberal notion that human happiness requires social 
institutions to respect a separation between the collective and the 
individual will. In any case, however, the argument that several 
explicit provisions of the Constitution may imply an (unexplicit) 
right of privacy is hardly frivolous, any more than it is frivolous to 
assert, for example, that the government sometimes "takes" private 
property by regulating it too severely. 
Berns's argument is unsatisfying in another way as well. A 
good deal of what he says is just the familiar, Frankfurterian plea 
for the passive virtues. But the ideal of deference to the elected 
branches needs more justification than Berns gives it. The argu-
ment that needs to be made cannot rely solely on the ineptness of 
the judiciary, even if that is granted. All us readers of the Wall 
Street Journal's editorial page know about ham-handed judges; but 
we also know more than we learned in Civics class about politicians 
as well. Furthermore, Professor Arrow's impossibility theorem is 
by now pretty well diffused in literate society; even the most un-
abashed democrat will appreciate how precarious is the claim that 
vox populi should direct public policy. It needs to be defended (not 
merely asserted) that the judicial function should in principle be 
incapable of enlargement through practice. Taking judicial review 
seriously, as Berns purports to do, would seemingly imply a judicial 
function exactly as flexible as the legislative disposition to circum-
vent the fundamental law. 
Berns readily concedes that judicial review is a defensible infer-
ence from the structure of the Constitution. His argument is less 
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than entirely clear concerning how he thinks the courts ought to 
operate, and why he views most equal protection jurisprudence, in-
cluding Brown v. Board of Education, as questionable. Eventually, 
re-reading and translating Berns's points into my own jargon, I dis-
cerned what I take to be an interesting argument. 
According to Berns-this is para-translation now, not quota-
tion-the legalistic and institutional machinery founded by the 
Constitution embodies a theory of the good life, of human happi-
ness. The Constitution implies at least a rudimentary theory of so-
cial cause and effect, as well-a prediction of how people in society 
will behave under the influence of certain incentives. How the Con-
stitution structures civil government, including the rights that it ac-
knowledges (immunities from certain kinds of collective authority 
rather than promises of fair distributions), necessarily implies a hy-
pothesis about human social nature: indeed, to adopt the current 
idiom, it is a theory of how and why civil government fails, and 
what can be done to keep it from failing. 
When Berns argues that the result in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion wasn't actually "authorized" by anything in the Constitution, I 
guess he means to say more than that society suffers an incremental 
harm from a marginal instance of ultra vires action by certain 
judges. The harm inflicted by the assertion of topiary freedom in 
interpreting the Constitution is the introduction of what might be 
called democratic (as opposed to republican) virtues and institu-
tions into fundamental law. These two visions of society are differ-
ent from one another, and they do not fulfill one another. Just the 
opposite: they are downright incompatible. Republican institutions 
(such as property) and its associated virtues (such as thrift, fore-
sight, industry, prudence) cannot for long co-exist with a reformed 
Constitution that requires assets to be re-deployed in the interest of 
politically defined desiderata such as justice or fairness. 
But of course if that is Berns's complaint, his quarrel is not 
with expansive judicial interpretation as such-which might be en-
tirely consistent with republican virtues-but rather with the partic-
ular decisions reached. And this criticism is fair enough: if the 
rules of the game are going to prefer fair shares or some similar 
redistributive tenet, then everything under the jurisdiction of the 
government is in principle subject to appropriation; one need only 
show that this is "just" in order to be entitled. Thus the material 
world becomes a common pool. In such a world, the game is 
stacked in favor of those who live by the rule of grabbing the most, 
soonest. Republican institutions and virtues cannot compete in 
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such an atmosphere and thus become the first victim of the Tragedy 
of the Commons. 
The novus ordo seclorum that the founders founded was new 
precisely in that it expected people to behave self-interestedly. Un-
like older political systems that had aimed at the perfection of 
human nature ("laws make men better"), the American system was 
designed to frustrate zealotry through what we should call sublima-
tion. Commerce, not Christianity, was to be the established all-
American religion. In Europe, the dominant fact of political life for 
hundreds of years had been sectarian conflict-poor, nasty, brutish, 
and long. Our Constitution would turn loose this fertile source of 
libidinal energy on a nobler objective than the honor of God or the 
salvation of the soul, namely, getting rich. 
Whether or not historians of the Federalist period will be per-
suaded by this interpretation of events, the worthiness of Berns's 
vision cannot be denied. A world in which commercial competition 
replaces religious strife has everything to be said for it. Wise gover-
nors will, if they have the wits, create a civic environment in which 
people may behave "naturally"-as human beings, not angels-and 
yet at the same time constructively. This is the great consequential-
ist argument for property rights. 
A review can seldom do justice to a serious book, and I fear 
having judged Berns's very serious book too harshly. Much of my 
criticism probably boils down to the different perspectives that law-
yers and political theorists have of the subject. Unlike most law-
yers, Berns is concerned less with the problem of interpretation 
than with understanding larger questions of democracy. It is re-
freshing to get these crosslights on a Constitution that is equally the 
property of all serious people and, to our good fortune, our funda-
mental law as well. 
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